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NOTE
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

NEGLIGENT EMPLOYER'S

RIGHTS

-

SUBROGATION
AGAINST

-

His JOINT

CONCURRENTLY
TORTFEASOR.-

John Doe is injured by the concurring negligent acts of his employer and a third party. Doe collects his award for the injury
from the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the
state; the employer then wishes to exercise his statutory
authority by subrogating himself to Doe's cause of action against
the third party. Thus the question is posed: Does the employer's
concurrent negligence bar his recovery (via subrogation) from
the joint tortfeasor?
The general rule in the United States is that there may be no
contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors,l courts having
been loath to adjust the burdens of misconduct,2 waste time with
lawbreakers, :' and adopt what would amount to a doctrine of
comparative negligence. 4 There are, however, certain exceptions to
the general rule,-- and many states have, through judicial decisions
or enactment of statutes, allowed some degree of contribution
between joint tortfeasors' At any rate the principal question of a
concurrently negligent employer's right to contribution or indemnity of some sort under the Workmen's Compensation Acts should
be considered in the light of the above-mentioned rule.
The employer seeking contribution comes into court under rights
granted him by subrogation provisions of his state's Workmen's
Compensation Act,7 hoping for a favorable statutory construction,
since no state's statutes expressly provide for a situation like the
1. Byron Jackson Co. v. Woods, 41 Cal. App.2d 777, 107 P.2d 639, 643 (1940);
Rode v. Adley Express Co., 130 Conn. 274, 33 A.2d 329, 332 (1943); University
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Caltagirone, 119 N.J. Eq. 491, 182 Atd. 862, 863 (1936); Cooley,
Torts §83 (4th ed. 1932); 19 Va. L. Rev. 881, 883 (1933).
2. Newman v. Fowler, 37 N. J. L. (8 Vroom) 89, 90 (1874).
3. Avery v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 221 Mo. 71, 119 S.W. 1106, 1110 (1909).
4. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941).
5. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal. Law Rev. 413, 428 (1937)
mentions the following exceptions: (1)
Partners; (2) He under a secondary duty may
sue him under a primary duty; (3) Respondeat superior (master or principal may seek
indemnity from servant or agent); and (4) The passively negligent party may recover
from the active wrongdoer.
6. Id. at 427; 43 Col. Law Rev. 395, 396, n. 2 & 3 (1943). (Judicial decisions:
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin.
Statutes:
Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia).
See also 9 Uniform Laws 161 (adopted by four states
and Hawaii); Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 243 (1939).
7. Del. Rev. Code, 16108 (1935), a typical subrogation statute, provides: "...
If
compensation is awarded under this chapter, the employer having paid the compensation
or having become liable therefor, shall 1- suhrogated to the rights of the injured employee,
or of his dependents to recover daoagmt- again.t such third person, and may recover . . .
the indemnity paid or payable to the injured uinployee."
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one under discussion.- Generally he is successful, for the majority
of cases has been been decided in favor of the jointly negligent
employer who looks to the other tortfeasor for recovery." The
minority view allows the third party tortfeasor to set up the employer's concurring or contributory negligence as a defense.'
Some of the reasons advanced to support the majority decisions
are: (1) The statute made no exception to the subrogated right
of an employer to recover against a third person (even though
his negligence only concurred with that of the employer to produce the injury)" (2) The beneficiaries of the compensation
award, will, by virtue of the employer's suit, have some protection
for their interest in the proceeds of the judgment entered
against the third party.-' (3) An employer should receive some
benefit in return for his absolute liability under the Workmen's

8. Schneider,

Workmen's Compensation Law §144 & 45

(2d ed. 1932).

9. Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller and Paine, 240 Fed. 376 (8th Cir. 1917); Finnegan
v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal.2d 409, 218 P.2d 17, 33 (1950); Pacific Indemnity Co. v.
California Electric Works, 29 Cal. App.2d 260, 84 P.2d 313 (1938); Milosevick v.
Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 Pac. 15 (1924); Williams Brothers Lumber
Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384 (1951); Fidelity and Casualty Co. v.
Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W. 709 (1919); City of Shreveport
v. Southwestern Gas and Electric Co.,.145 La. 680, 82 So. 785 (1919); Utley v. Taylor
and Gaskin Inc., 305
Mich. 561, 9 N.W.2d 842 (1943); Nyquist v. Batcher, 235
Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952); General Box Co. v. Missouri Utilities Co.. 331 Mo.
845, 55 S.W.2d 442 (1932); Graham v. City of Lincoln, 106 Neb. 305, 183 N.W.
569 (1921); American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Alcoa Steamship Company, 266 App.
Div. 992. 45 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1943); Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Shafton, 231
Wis. 1, 283 N.W. 806 (1939); Clark v. Chicago M., St. P. and P. R. Co., 214 Wis. 295,
252 N.W. 685 (1934).
10. Hekmoan Biscuit Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 291 Mich. 156, 289 N.W. 113
(1939); Thornton Bros. Co. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 246 N.W. 527 (1933); United States
Trucking Corporation v. New York and Pennsylvania Motor Express, 177 Misc. 377, 32
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1941); Essick v. City of Lexington, 233 N.C. 600, 65 S.E.2d 220
(1951); Eledge v. Carolina Power and Light Co., 230 N.C. 584, 55 S.E.2d 179 (1949)
(Here the employer's negligence bars his recovery of that part of the judgment which
would otherwise inure to his benefit); Brown v. Southern By. Co., 202 N.C. 256, 169
S.E. 419
(1933); Corey and Son, Limited v. France, Fenwick & Co., Limited,
I K. B 114 (1911).
11. Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Cedar Valley ElectricCo., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W.
77
709, 711 (1919) "There is nothing express or implied in section24
m6 from which the
conclusion can be drawn that the payment of compensation by the employer whose
act, jointly with that of another, produced the injuries, shall operate as a bar against the
right of an employee or the party paying the compensation and entitled to be subrogated to
his rights to maintain an action against the person other than the employer although a
joint tortfeasor for damages." See also Utley v. Taylor and Gaskin Inc., 305 Mich. 561,
9 N.W.2d 842, 847 (1943); General Box Co. v. Missouri Utilities Co. 331 Mo. 845,
55 S.W.2d 442, 448 (1932).
12. City of Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas and Electric Co. 145 La. 680, 82 So.
785 (1919); Nyquist v. Batcher 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952); see also
statutes cited note 29 infra.
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Compensation Acts.'
(4) To hold otherwise would defeat the
intent of the legislature."
The courts in the majority, avoiding for the most part any statutory construction, nevertheless have relied on what seems to be
undeniable logic in reasoning: (1) Joint tortfeasors should not
be allowed contribution or indemnity. 5 (2) One should not be
allowed to profit by his own wrong."' (3) An employer should
have no more rights than his employee whose injury is the basis
for the action."7 At least one" of the minority cases, however, can
be distinguished on the ground that a co-employee's negligence
was imputed to the employer."'
Though it seems well-recognized that the problems in adjusting
'
all parties' rights in these cases are manifold,20
there has been much
dissatisfaction with the results our courts have reached.' Supposedly an employer who operates under the Workmen's Compensation Act will add its costs to his product's price, thus transferring the burden to the consumer. He is aided, in many instances,
by a compulsory liability insurance plan, which tends to equalize
the costs over an entire industry.2 Yet, according to the majority
13. Williams Brothers Lumber Co. v. Meisel 85 Ga. App. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384, 388,
(1951) 'It is true that by virtue of Code, 1114-403 an employer may escape liability for
its negligence where such negligence combines with that of another to produce an injury
upon an employee of the employer, and would force the third party to pay damages for
injuries which were caused not by his negligence alone, but this is one of the benefits
that is granted to an employer coming under the Act and compensates for the many
instances where the employer must pay compensation for an injury for which he would
not have been liable at common law."
14. Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 153 C.C.A. 302, 240 Fed. 376, 379
(8th Cir. 1917).
15. Thornton Brothers Co. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 246 N.W. 527 (1933). See
also dissent 188 Minn. 5, 11, 246 N.W. 527, 530 'in which it is mentioned that
pleading the contributory negligence of the employer as a defense seems anomalous, for
the non-negligent employee's cause of action is the basis for the suit.
16. Essick v. City of Lexington, 233 N.C. 600, 65 S.E.2d 220 (1951).
17. Brown v. Southern By. Co., 202 N.C. 256, 169 S.E. 419, 420 (1933) "When
the injured workman sues a third party to recover for his injuries, the contributory
negligence of the workman is an available defense, and therefore it would seem equally
reasonable that when the employer prosecutes the suit for his own benefit, the same
defense should not be denied. Certainly an employer is entitled to no greater immunity
than his injured employee."
18. Hekman Biscuit Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 291 Mich. 158, 289 N.W. 113
(1939).
19. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 175.23 (1952) (expresses the
view that an employer should not be barred by a defense of concurring negligence when
the negligence is only that of a co-employee). ,
20. Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation, 416 (1950) "Perhaps the
most difficult legal problem in the matter of third party tort liability is the adjustment of
the relative rights between the injured workman, the employer, the insurance carrier and
the third party tortfeasor. While the protection of the workman and his dependents is
the main object, of this type of remedial legislation, it should not inflict any undue or
unnecessary hardship on the other parties involved."
)
21. 36 Minn. L. Rev. 549, 551 (1952
"... None of the decisions, irrespective of
whether they allow or deny the defense, provide a satisfactory answer to the objection
that they do not fairly apportion the damages between the wrongdoers."
22. Prosser, Torts J69 (1941).
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of decisions, the employer is not only allowed contribution from
a joint tortfeasor (in itself a contraventidn of the general rule),
'
but he is often conceded an absolute shift of liability! 2
Anything he collects, then, would seem to be pure profit, at least
under the above-mentioned theory that the ultimate consumer; not
the employer, pays the Workmen's Compensation costs.
The apparent inequity of the situation at hand might logically
inspire the question: can the joint tortfeasor hope to recover over
against the negligent employer? The majority of jurisdictions would
respond negatively,24 probably on the ground that the employer
is not jointly liable to his employee in tort, and so cannot be a
joint tortfeasor; the liability which rests on the employer is an
absolute one, regardless of negligence, and such is the only kind of
liability which can fall on him whether he is negligent or not.2"
Another ground would be that the negligent third person has no
greater burden than borne by him before the passage of the act.2'
Only where the employer has breached an independent duty to
27
the third party will the courts allow recovery over.
The employee who elects2t1 to take the Workmen's Compensation
award fares very well in most states through the employer's subrogated action against the third party. In Massachusetts, for instance, he receives four-fifths of any excess the employer recovers
above what will indemnify him for the award he paid to the employee.29 The employer, as we have seen, does well in his own
right, through the right of subrogation. Only three ,states 0 have
23. Cases cited note 9 supra.
24. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vallendingham, 94 F. Supp. 17 (D. D. C. 1950);
Lo Bue v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Baltimore Transit Co. v.
State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1944); Britt v. Buggs, 201 Wis. 533, 230 N.W.
621 (1930).
Contra: Rappa v. Pittston Stevedoring Corporation, 48 F. Supp. 911
(E.D.N.Y. 1943).
25. Cases cited note 24 supra.
26. Milosevich v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 Pac. 15, 18
(1924) "To hold -that in such an action the defendant is liable for the full amount of
damages sustained -by the employee, irrespective of the contributory negligence of the
employer, is casting no burden upon the negligent third person greater than that borne
by him prior to the enactment of the statute. Before the passage of any workmen's
compensation acts a negligent third person was responsible for all damages sustained
through his negligence to one in the employ of another, and the fact that the employer
was liable for such injury jointly with a third person was no defense to such an action
in whole or in part, nor could it be made the basis of any proceedings against the
employer for contribution toward payment of the judgment recovered by the employee
against the third person."
27. American District Telephone Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950);
Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); Westchester Lightning Co.
v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E. 2d 567 (1938).
28. See Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 152 §15 (1932) "...
The employee may at his
option proceed either at law against that person to recover damages or against the insurer
for compensation under this chapter. but not against both."
29. Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 152 515; (1932)
See also N. Y. Consolidated Laws,
Workmen's Compensation Law 129 (1952).
30. New Hampshire, Ohio and West Virginia. See Crab Orchard Improvement Co.
v. Chesapeake and 0. Ry., 33 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.W.Va. 1940).

NOTE

no subrogation statute,31 though North Dakota and Washington
are the only states which allow only the state fund to be subrogated
to the employee's action.32 The rest of the jurisdictions provide for
four types of subrogation: (1) Absolute (where the employee's
caus( of action is assigned unconditionally to the employer), as in
Michigan. '3 (2) Subrogation and direct action co-existent (Wisconsin and California--either the employer or employee can sue).3'
(3) Employee priority (as in New York; the employee has six
months after the awarding of compensation to bring a third party
suit, and on failing to do so, has his right of action assigned to the
employer (Illinois' statute is similar, the time being only three
months, however) ).35 (4) Subrogee priority (as in Maine, where
the situation described in illustration 3 supra is reversed)." With
such statutes and strong precedent of construction in his favor,
then, the employer, like his employee, stands to benefit at the
expense of the third party.
Illinois is the only state which has managed to avoid the majority
result by legislation; the Illinois statute denies subrogation to the
employer who would have been liable to the employee at common
law. : One writer, too, proposes that an employer's suit be barred
in "subrogation jurisdictions", if his negligence was direct and personal, on the general equitable subrogation principle that the
subrogee must not sue on a loss to which he contributed38 At any
rate, it appears that without legislation more cognizant of the
rights of all parties in actions like these, the negligent employer
will continue to profit by his own wrongs.
Since North Dakota has no "employer-subrogation" statute,39 it
is difficult to imagine how such a case might arise here. Left to
conjecture, one might venture that in the event an employer falls
behind in his premium payments to the State Fund, is subsequently
sued by an injured employee under the Act and forced to compensate him personally, then a right of subrogation might arise
in the employer against the third party. But this, of course, is pure

speculation.

KENNETH MORAN.

31. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 174.11, n. 23 (1952).
32. N. D. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 343 "The fund shall be subrogated pro tanto to the
rights of the injured employee or his dependents to the extent of the amount of
compensation paid. . ." See also Wash. Rev. Code 151.24.010 (1951).
33. Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 1413.15.
34. Wis. Stats. 1102.29 (1949).
35. N.Y. Consolidated Laws, Workmen's Compensation Law §29 (1952).
36. Maine Rev. Stats. c. 26 125 (1944).
37. Iii Rev. Stats. c. 48, 1138.5 (b) (1951).
38. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 575.23 (1952).
39. See note 32 supra.

